The Anti-Slavery Bugle.

MARIUS R. ROBINSON, Editor. "NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS." ANN PEARSON, Publishing Agent.

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THE BUGLE.

John Freeman—Habeas Corpus.

We have listened to no small amount of discussion since 1850, on the question "does the fugitive slave law supersede the writ of Habeas Corpus?" We could never indulge a doubt of it, but Whigs and Democrats have. The question has at length been raised in the case of John Freeman, at Indianapolis, and at least one judge has decided for the supremacy of the fugitive slave law.

We cannot better present this question than it was done by the following letter of Freeman's counsel to the Editor of the Indiana Free Democrat, from which we also copy the opinion of the court, and a portion of the proceedings in the case. In a previous number of our paper, we erroneously stated that Freeman was discharged. He is imprisoned there, and awaits his final trial, which was deferred nine weeks, to give him opportunity to prepare for his trial.

This U. S. Commissioner must have been a rare man for his post, or he would have obeyed the law and granted a summary trial, instead of so long an adjournment.

The Democrat also contains copies of papers certifying beyond possibility of doubt, the freedom of the man, if he shall be able to verify them.

Here is the letter from Freeman's Counsel:

MR. EDITOR:—Our position before Judge Major, among others, was, that the prisoner, Freeman, could "controvert the return to the writ of *habeas corpus*, or allege any new matter in avoidance"—Rev. Stat., 2 vol., p. 195; that the right to "allege new matter," of course, implied the right to hear the evidence; and that the exercise of this right by a State Court is not, in the least, in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, or any act of Congress.

We conceded that the Judge could not give to the claimant a certificate of removal of Freman into slavery, that that could be done alone by the U. S. Courts, or their commissioners, upon "satisfactory proof;" and that, the very moment it appeared that Freeman was a slave, the jurisdiction of the State Judge would cease—he could then only remand him to the custody of the U. States' officer.

But we insisted that until that fact appeared the presumption was, that he was a free man and that the State Court, or Judge, was fully competent to investigate that fact. It is not to be taken for granted, because Mr. Ellington claims Freeman *to be his slave*, that he *is*, therefore, his slave; and until that appears, the State Court, or Judge, is not ousted of jurisdiction.

This view of the case is perfectly consistent with all that is claimed for the fugitive slave law. It was never intended by that law that the United States should reach forth her arm into a free State and seize a free man. She has no more right to *touch such a man*, than the State Court has to discharge a *slave* from the custody of his master. The truth is, the whole difficulty is a difficulty of *fact*, not of *law*. We admit, that the very moment it is conceded, or appears from proof, that the person arrested is a *slave*, the jurisdiction of the State Court ceases. And we assert, that the very moment that it is conceded, or appears, that the person arrested is a *free man*, the jurisdiction of the U. S. Courts, under the fugitive slave law, ceases.

The question then is, Is he a *free man or a slave?* And we assert, that the State Court is just as *competent* to try this fact as the U. S. Court. And, as the presumption of all law is, that all are free whose feet tread upon free soil, that it was much more *becoming* and *satisfactory* that the State Court should try the question of fact. And to assume the reverse of these plain propositions is to yield the sovereignity of a State to a *claim*, that has nothing to sustain it but arrogance.

KETCHAM, BARBOUR, & COBURN.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

My line of duty in this case is perfectly clear and plain. The act of Congress, approved September 18, 1850, called the Fugitive Slave Law, vests in commissioners appointed under the act of Congress, in the judges of the circuit and district courts of the U. S., and in judges of the superior courts of territories, the power and authority to carry into effect the provisions of that law. Neither this or any other act of Congress confers such power upon a State court or officer. Nor is there any act of the General Assembly of Indiana which even attempts to vest such power in any of her officers or tribunals.

Under this act of Congress, Commissioner Sullivan issued his warrant for the apprehension of John Freeman, a man of color, upon the alleged ground that he owed service to Pleasant Ellington, for the purpose of having him taken before the Commissioner, that the right of the claimant to his services might be investigated. While the alleged fugitive was in the Deputy Marshal's hands by virtue of that warrant, and before investigation was had before the Commissioner, Freeman was brought before me on a writ of *habeas corpus*, to which the Deputy Marshal made his return, alleging that he had him in custody by virtue of said warrant issued by said Commissioner. Freeman answered the return by controverting it—by setting up his freedom, and controverting Ellington's right to claim him as his slave.

Freeman's counsel contends that a judge of the circuit court of Indiana had jurisdiction to go beyond the warrant of the Commissioner, and hear the evidence and inquire whether he owed service to Ellington or not. In other words, that I can substitute myself in the place of Commissioner Sullivan, and proceed to hear the evidence as to whether Freeman was Ellingtou's slave or not, which I had prevented him from hearing by virtue of this writ of *habeas corpus*. It is contended that circuit judges possess this power, not by virtue of any act of Congress, not by virtue of any act of the General Assembly of this State, but by virtue of the State sovereignty of Indiana, and her duty and power, as such, to protect her citizens from improper and illegal restraints; and it was compared to the right of the United States, to resist British aggression in impressing our seamen; and 2d. Upon the following clause in the 723d sec. of R. S. of In., p. 198, relating to writs of *habeas corpus*, viz.; "The plaintiff may accept to the sufficiency of, or controvert the return or any part thereof, or allege any new matter in avoidance."

These positions are untenable for the following reasons:

1. The State of Indiana has surrendered this attribute of her sovereignty, as shown by a portion of the second section of the fourth article of the constitution, namely: "No person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

2. The case of Prigg *v.* The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16, Peters R. S. C. U. S., Rep., p. 539, settles and puts at rest the question of jurisdiction over fugitives from labor, in favor of the exclusive jurisdiction in the United States, and that no State Legislation can control it, and consequently no State officer, unless he is vested with authority, by act of Congress, can exercise any jurisdiction over the question of freedom or slavery. In the case of Wright *v.* Deacon, 5 S. and Rawle, 62, it was held, that the writ of *homine replegiando* did not lie to try the right of the fugitive to freedom, though on the return of the fugitive to the State from which he fled, his right to freedom might be tried. In relation to the case of Prigg *v.* The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, there is the following language in a note to 1 Kent's Com., p. 445: "It was there declared, that the national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary, was bound through its proper department, legislative, executive or judiciary, as the case might require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the constitution. Any legislation by Congress, in a case within its jurisdiction, supersedes all State Legislation, and impliedly prohibits it."

"The Constitution and laws of the United States secure the right to the owner to reclaim fugitive slaves against State Legislation." 1 Kent's Com., p. 273, note.

There is another well established principle, which bears on the question under consideration, namely: that no State can control the exercise of any authority under the federal government. 1 Kent's Com. 461.—This question is settled by several decisions of controlling authority. "No State tribunal can interfere with seizures of property made by revenue officers, under the laws of the United States; nor interrupt, by process of replevin, injunction or otherwise, the exercise of the authority of the federal officers." 1 Kent's Com. 432. If the officer of the United States who seizes, or the court which awards the process to seize, has jurisdiction of the subject matter, then the inquiry into the validity of the seizure belongs exclusively to the federal courts." *Ib.*

The General Assembly of Indiana, so far from intending to confer power on her officers to interfere by *habeas corpus* with fugitive slaves, by the clause of the *habeas corpus* act above referred to, at sec. 725, on p. 195, 2 R. S., provides as follows: "No court or Judge *shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process*, whereby the party is in *custody*, or discharge him where the term of commitment has not expired in either of the cases following: 1. Upon process issued by any court or judge of the United States, where the court or judge has exclusive jurisdiction."

The Commissioner, so far as he exercises jurisdiction over fugitive slaves, is a court, and therefore will fall within the express exemption of the Statute. As to the question in hand, it is immaterial whether the Commissioner is a court or not, as I only refer to it to show that the Legislature of Indiana, did not intend by any provision of the *habeas corpus* act, to confer any such power, and thus bring her officers in collision with the authority of the United States. But I have already shown that if the General Assembly of Indiana has passed a law in express terms, authorizing her tribunals or officers to exercise jurisdiction in determining whether a fugitive from labor is a freeman or a slave, that such act of the General Assembly would be void, and no judicial officer would carry it out for that reason; besides, the State officer would not be safe in executing such a law. Were I to exercise jurisdiction over this case and discharge Freeman, whereby he escapes, I should render myself personally responsible to Ellington for his value, provided Freeman was his slave.

I am at a loss to discover what difference it can make to Freeman, to have the question, whether he was a freeman or owed service to Ellington, investigated before me rather than before Com. Sullivan. Com. Sullivan will hear the evidence that can be adduced for and against Freeman—I could do no more. I am satisfied that I have not got the slightest shadow of an authority to enter into such an investigation. Com. Sullivan has, and is fully competent to do it, and will, I have no doubt, extend to Freeman, in the investigation, all the latitude that I would, and therefore nothing could be gained by my investigating the subject instead of Com. Sullivan.

The Counsel for Freeman then made an effort to have him discharged, because of alleged disqualification of the Commissioner to hold that office. The State court however overruled that question, and the parties met before Commissioner Sullivan.

Mr. Walpole asked that the fugitive be brought into court.

The Court: The Marshall will produce him.

Whereupon, the Marshal, John L. Robinson, gave direction to a party of his *posse* to bring Freeman into the court house.

Mr. Liston asked that the cause be continued until next Wendesday, or for two weeks, to enable Ellington to prepare for trial. He had no speech to make, but asked it as a matter of right.

The Court required him to reduce his motion to writing, which he did. The motion, as written out, was that the cause be continued until next Monday two weeks, to enable the claimant to take depositions to establish his claim, according to the acts of Congress in such cases made and provided.

Mr. Ketcham for the prisoner, moved for a rule on Ellington to show cause on next Monday why he should not give security for costs, he being a non-resident of this State. In support of this motion, he read the rule of the circuit court of the U. S. for this circuit, to that effect; and also referred to the law of Congress to enable district and circuit courts to make such rules.

Mr. Walpole said no law of Congress required it; it it did, it would be in violation of the constitution of the U. S. He also alluded to the summary character of the proceedings in such cases as a reason why no such rule should be given; and said that claimant had already paid the Marshal $50, and was ready to pay costs as fast as they might accrue.

John L. Robinson, Marshal, being called on, said he had received $50 from Ellington.

Mr. Ketchum said, if there were any decision against the rule he did not desire it. There were, however, important questions to be tried in the case. The Fugitive Slave Law contemplated a fair investigation. This would call for the taking of depositions and large expenditures of money; not only by the claimant, but also by the alleged fugitive. Suppose after the accumulation of heavy costs, this claim should be defeated, and the prisoner released, who shall pay these costs? We have no right to the services of the officers without compensation. They are to be indemnified; or will they release us? We have an unquestionable right to their services, and we ask to be secured against the payment of costs which the claimant compels us to make.

Mr. Liston: To whom would the bond be made payable?

Mr. Ketchum: To Freeman. He is entitled to be made safe. He is forced to make the costs, and if the claim is false, he should have security against him who compelled him to make them.

[Here the claimant under the direction of counsel, pulled out his purse, and emptying out a handful of gold coins, handed a $10 piece to Mr. Liston, who with great pomposity handed it to the commissioner, at the same time saying: "There is the utmost amount you can demand of us; and the costs of others we are ready to pay just as fast as fast as they may accrue. If this claim shall be decided against the claimant, your Honor will fork back $5 of that." He also said that he would not argue the motion; nor if ruled to give security for costs would the claimant in any event do it.]

Mr. Ketchum: "This display of money and the accompanying remarks are altogether unauthorized and unbecoming in this court." He then entered at large into the probable amount of costs, showing that the prisoner would be under the necessity of going to Virginia and Georgia to procure the evidence of his freedom.

Mr. Liston said: He must insist that the case should be heard in a summary manner. If it is continued from time to time, will it be so heard. This is not a suit—it is a claim under the constitution of the U. S. The Marshal is not acting as an officer; but only as the agent of the slaveholder. No officer is bound to act until paid his fees. The Marshal is already paid. You've got all you *can* claim. If you decide the fugitive not to be our slave, then you must pay us back FIVE DOLLARS of what we have given you. This is not a suit—it is only a legal demand of our right under the constitution. Any fees made by the defendant, we are not bound to pay. We have paid the Marshal more than he demands—we have paid your Honor all you *can* demand—we are ready to pay all money legally demanded of us, but if you should grant a rule upon us for security for costs, *we will not give it.*

Mr. Barbour: Mr. Liston says this is not a trial—not a suit—not a cause. What is a trial, suit or cause, if this be not? Here is a court—here are officers—here are two parties—and here are their attorneys. But it is said that these proceedings are summary; and what is intended by that? Nothing more, certainly, than that there is no jury allowed in these causes. The rule then applies in this case for security for costs, by the same reason as in any other case.

To strengthen the motion, Mr. Barbour then proceeded to show the nature of the prisoner's defense to the claim of Ellington, and the time and probable costs of obtaining the evidence necessary to sustain the defense. For this purpose, he introduced an affidavit containing substantially a statement of the same facts as those which appear in the pleas filed before the judge of the circuit court. The same papers also accompanied the affidavit as those accompanying the pleas. The affidavit alleged that the prisoner was free in Brunswick county, Virginia, as long ago as 1831; and that from 1832 till 1844, the time when he removed to to this State, he was free, and as a freeman, resided in Walton county, Georgia. Mr. B. also referred to certain telegraphic despatches tending to show that the claim of Ellington was false and fraudulent.

At this point Com. Sullivan pushed the $10 gold coin away from him; and avowed he would not have any fee in the case, let it be decided as it might be.

Mr. Ketchum still insisted on the rule for costs. The case was one that called for security. The prisoner had money to prepare for his defense. He had made some money. He was willing to expend it in defending his liberty. He would yield it all up to show that he was free—the last cent should go; and when that little stream was dried up, there were other and larger streams that would be opened to aid him in so worthy a purpose.

Mr. Walpole replied at length. It was admitted that claimant had a right to a continuance; and there is no law to authorize security for costs. The law don't contemplate a trial; for in a trial there is equality of rights between the parties. Here is no equality of right. The claimant may take affidavit instead of depositions; *while the fugitive has no right to introduce any evidence to show his freedom.* Alludes to the discussions in the U. S. Senate while the law was pending there. The trial of the question of freedom or slavery *must be tried, if at all, in the Slave States.* He denied the right of the prisoner to ask a continuance; for as he has no right to offer any evidence in the case if he were so prepared, he can have no right to continue the cause to procure evidence which he cannot offer. Nevertheless, he was willing to give the prisoner 30 days to prepare to show that he was free, though he did not believe he was. It was often the case that such men supported their pretensions to freedom by forged papers, gotten up by abolitionists for the purpose. The judge would become personally liable by making an order for costs. Do you suppose Congress has enabled you to oppose the obstruction of costs upon the claimans's right. Such power would violate his constitutional rights. To require security for costs would make you liable for an escape. The rule of court referred to is of no force. The judiciary has no power to make a law, and if it should attempt it, the law would be void.

Mr. Ketchum referred Mr. Walpole to the act of Congress of 1827, conferring certain powers on courts, and among them the right to adopt certain rules of court, regulating the practice, &c.

Mr. Walpole read the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania; and called on the other party; to show a precedent on their side. He then made some general remarks, placing the law Congress above that of conscience.

But the Marshal is bound for the safety of the fugitive; and, if he is liberated by your act, then the penalties of the law will recoil on your own head. If you take this step, you do it at your peril. We demand that it shall not be done.

He then descanted on the liberality of his offer to give 30 days: and alleged that the expense of the 30 days would be $300 to claimant. Besides, he spoke of them as days of sorrow to his client—days of mobs and riots, &c.

When Mr. Walpole concluded, he was ably answered by Messrs. Coburn and Ketchum, who met all his positions, and showed that, bad as the Fugitive Slave Law was, it was not so bad as to admit of the outrages which gentlemen seemed willing to perpetrate in its name. It did, they contended, admit of an investigation full and ample, to establish the freedom of the prisoner, if it existed. They also urged the propriety of ruling the claimant to give security for costs, which question the court took under advisement and gave the parties nine weeks from the 27th of June to prepare their proofs, and get ready for trial.

With this decision of the Commissioner all parties seemed pleased; and they left the court house in a better humor with themselves and each other, than was to be expected, all things considered.

The following will make our readers acquainted with some further particulars.—From them it will be seen that no effort will be spared to reduce this poor man to slavery. If they can get him away from his home and his acquaintances, with only the Ohio river between him and slavery, they doubtless hope to spirit him away somehow. Hence the attempt to move him to Madison.

From the Indiana Free Democrat.

THE CASE OF JOHN FREEMAN.

We mentioned last week that John Freeman, a respectable colored man of this city, had been apprehended as a fugitive slave, and that his case was pending when we went to press, (Wednesday morning) before Hon. Stephen Major, Judge of the Marion Circuit Court, on a writ of *Habeas Corpus*. The proceedings had before Judge Major and the subsequent proceedings before Commissioner Sullivan, will be found elsewhere in this paper.

The case has caused great excitement, and it would be strange if it had not. Freeman has resided here as a freeman for nine years, having come here from Georgia in 1844.—During this period, by his industry and uprightness he has secured the esteem of all acquainted with him.

When Freeman came here he brought with him a considerable amount of property. He deposited, we understand, $600 in Bank; he soon purchased property, and married a respectable girl, then living in the family of Rev. Henry W. Beecher. He has a family of three children, not five as we erroneously stated last week. By his industry and frugality he has acquired property to the amount of four or five thousand dollars.

The manner of Freeman's arrest and the insolence of the claimant had no tendency to prevent excitement. The cowardly officers who arrested him, did so by resorting, as usual in such cases, to falshood and deception. They represented to him that he was required to go to the office of a Justice of the Peace to give testimony in a case wherein another colored man was a party.—The unsuspecting man accompanied them to the office of Esq. Sullivan, the United States Commissioner. Stopping for a moment at the office of Mr. Ketcham, which is adjoining the Commissioner's office, he was there apprehended and hurried before Commissioner Sullivan. There was great reluctance to give Freeman opportunity to consult counsel. Mr. Ketcham, appearing as one of his counsel, demanded opportunity to consult his client in private, and he was reluctantly permitted to take Freeman into his office for this purpose. The consultation had continued but a few minutes before the claimant, with his posse, called at the door, (which was locked) and became clamorous for his intended victim. Shortly after the door was opened by Mr. K., and officer Stapp and his assistant seized Freeman with a ferocity that would have done honor to tigers, and then hurried him down stairs and to the Court House, to which place the Commissioner had adjourned the hearing. Thither one of Freeman's counsel soon followed. When he arrived in Court, the claimant, Ellington, was insolently examining the mouth of Freeman, probably to discover certain marks therein. Counsel reminded the Court and the claimant that his client was a *man* and not a *horse*, and that he expected him to be treated as a man. In the mean time the people began to assemble, and it was evident that public sentiment would require a more deliberate trial than the claimant at first intended should be had.—The subsequent proceedings are given by our Reporter.

Wm. Sullivan, Esq., who issued the warrant, did not receive his appointment under the Fugitive Slave Act, but was appointed United States Commissioner for general purposes, previous to the passage of that act. That act, however, gives such Commissioners the same power on this subject as those appointed under the Fugitive Act. We have no doubt Mr. Sullivan engaged in this case against his own wishes. It was thought by some that in the outset he manifested a desire to dispose of the case too hastily.—Whether this is true or not we are unable to say. Being called unexpectedly to the consideration of the case, he may at first have misapprehended his duty. Since the return of the case form Judge Major, we think Mr. Sullivan has shown a disposition to do justice to both parties, so far as the law under which he acts will permit. Counsel for the claimant desired some time for themselves to prepare for trial, but denied that the defendent was entitled to a moment's time for his defense, but out of respect to public opinion they were willing to give thirty days, which they thought a reasonable time, to Freeman to procure evidence of his freedom, if any existed. The Commissioner looking at the distance to be traveled, deemed thirty days not a reasonable time and gave, we think, very properly, nine weeks from last Monday, which day is set for the further hearing of the case.

Thus the matter stands at present. Freeman is now in jail. Marshal Robinson on Monday gave his counsel notice that he sho'd remove him to some other place, but did not say where. The Madison Banner of this morning (Tuesday) says:

"Freeman, we learn, is to be brought down from Indianapolis to-day for safe-keeping in the jail of this county for sixty days; to have a hearing at the expiration thereof on a writ of *habeas corpus*. Probably the excitement with respect to him in Indianapolis is the moving reason of the change of vicinage."

If Freeman is to be removed from this place, it will be a great outrage. There is no necessity of any such removal. There are some Union-saving Hunkers who would like to provoke violence if they could. They would rejoice, we have no doubt, to see a riot, but if they get up one, we are certain they will have to get it up on their own hook. The friends of Freeman have no other desire than to see a fair trial; the counsel of Freeman will make the Marshal such propositions that he will receive the condemnation of every good citizen, if he refuses all of them and removes Freeman. We are assured he will not remove him to-day. We shall endeavor to advise our readers how the matter stands at the latest hour before going to press.

WE notice that at the recent State Temperance Convention in Rochester, attempts were made in certain quarters to prevent Frederick Douglass from speaking or voting in the Convention. Douglass has more brains than a squadron of the ungenerous spirits who hissed the colored specimen of God's handiwork.—*Cayuga Chief.*

☞A friend relates a case, in which a boy in school, who imbibed his politics from a democratic father, refused to cypher in *Federal* money.—*Essex Freeman.*

A gold medal worth $100, has been presented to John P. Hale, by the Com. of the U. S. vessel Germantown, for his services in abolishing the lash from the navy. A handsome testimony.

An Offering to Moloch.

At Clarksville, Texas, on the the 16th of June, two slaves were hanged for the murder of their master.

The execution of a murderer seldom excites the sympathies of the people—but we will not wrong the citizens of Clarksville by entertaining the thought that they did not regret the immolation of those victims at the bloody shrine of American Slavery.—While their feelings were moved for them, they deemed the bloody sacrifice necessary, under a system destructive as it is of all the noble traits which characterize a humane people.

The slaves were owned by a brute, whose continued ill-treatment and outrageous brutality rendered death preferable to servitude under his control, and (after repeated denials of their request that he should sell them,) the slaves, who were both young men under twenty, determined upon his destruction and a desperate attempt at obtaining freedom by flight into a wilderness, where they might find savages less barbarous, and could fall into the hands of none more cruel than him they had despatched.

They failed—were caught, and doomed to die upon the gallows. Although none expressed sorrow for the punishment the brutal master had received, (for he had fled to Texas from South Carolina for having killed a slave in the latter State,) people feared to speak out for the pardon of the negroes—it would have sounded too much like "abolition"—that bugbear which frightens men in the South and grannies in breeches in the North. They whispered to each other that these men were *not* murderers, and deserved no such fate—but they feared each other, and feared their slaves, and so stood by, coward-like, and saw them hanged for an action any of them would have been proud of in his own son! Such is the boasting "chivalry" of the far South—where men fear to do justice, lest justice be meted out to themselves—where outrage demands judicial sanction, and its punishment is rewarded with the gallows—and where a city of armed men is thrown into a panic by the raving of a drunken negro!—*Dispatch.*

A New Temperance Move.

An association of women in New Castle, Lawrence Co., Pa., have addressed a circular to their sisters throughout the State, in reference to the Maine Law. They talk in right good earnest, and so we doubt not they will work. We commend their proposition to the ladies of Ohio. We copy their address from the Tribune:

SISTERS IN THE COMMON BONDS OF HUMANITY: We, the women of New-Castle, Lawrence Co., Pa., have associated ourselves together in a regular organized and permanent Ladies' Temperance Association, the object of which is to meet as often as convenient to discuss and agitate the Temperance question among ourselves, in our families, and in the whole State, if possible, until our conventions meet to nominate our Legislators when we propose sending a Committee of ladies with petitions to each of those Conventions, praying them to nominate only such men as they know to be thorough-going Temperance men. And in order to ascertain how the men feel on this subject, whose names are announced as candidates for nomination, we will immediately, to-day I may say, address letters to each of these men, asking them to pledge themselves publicly in our county papers, at the earliest opportunity, to take up and carry through the Maine Liquor Law, (should they be elected for the next session of our Legislature.) If they pledge themselves unhesitatingly to carry out our wishes, we bid them God speed; but if they evade our question, we will set them down on the side of the enemy, and go in with heart and hand for those with whom we can trust such a momentous question.

This plan carried out in all the Counties of our State, as we intend to carry it out in this, will, we firmly believe, with the blessing of the Most High and the efforts which have been made heretofore, secure to us this long-prayed-for, and ever-to-be-admired law.

Believing thus, we, in behalf of our suffering sisters, most respectfully, earnestly, and prayerfully, beseech you to go and do likewise. Will the first lady who reads this greeting, please consider herself called upon individually to use all the efforts in her power to call a full meeting of the ladies of her town or city? When that is accomplished let this appeal be read and deliberated upon. And, ladies, think while you are so engaged, the ladies of every county town in the State are reading and deliberating upon a copy of the same. Let "who will be first in the field, and who will do most good when there," be your motto. While we are using all the means we can to accomplish our object, let us acknowledge God in all our ways, and He will direct our steps. Dear sisters let us send up a united and simultaneous prayer for succes to the God of the suffering and oppressed from the closet of every wife, mother and sister in Pennsylvania, and we must prevail. Send out your influence to your neighboring towns; let it flow out, wave upon wave, until they meet corresponding waves from adjoining counties; *there let them mingle and roll and surge, until there is a general upheaving of the whole State in favor of the Law that will cause thousands to leap for joy.* Do not say, when this subject is presented to you for consideration, that you have *no time to attend to it*, that it was likely started by a few enthusiasts. In answer to the first objection let us say, cannot each one of us economize time that we are in the habit of spending to little or no purpose, day after day, and in this time redeemed put forth all our energies in the noble cause that has claimed the attention of the greatest minds that ever dwelt in mortal form. Dear ladies, did each one of us burn the midnight taper waiting yet dreading the return of a drunken